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THE CFTC NET CAPITAL RULE-SHOULD A MORE
RISK-BASED APPROACH BE ADOPTED?
JERRY W. MARKHAM*
The leverage available from futures contracts and the price vola-
tility of the commodities underlying such contracts may cause large
losses and quickly threaten the financial viability of a futures commis-
sion merchant.' The insolvency of a futures commission merchant in
turn raises a concern that customer funds may be endangered. That
concern is heightened by the fact that there is no federal insurance
available to protect the customers of a futures commission merchant.2
In lieu of such protection, the futures industry uses margin re-
quirements to limit the accumulation of trading losses. The Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") also imposes certain
regulatory requirements that are designed to protect customer funds
held by futures commission merchants. One part of the CFTC's regu-
latory structure is a requirement that futures commission merchants
maintain a minimum amount of net capital in order to remain in busi-
ness.3 The CFTC's net capital rule is, however, only indirectly related
to the market risks encountered by futures commission merchants.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. A futures commission merchant is a broker that solicits customer orders and accepts
customer funds or monies in connection with the purchase and sale of commodity futures con-
tracts. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § la(12) (1994). These entities are the futures
industry analogue to the broker-dealer in the securities industry. A futures commission
merchant must register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") under the
Commodity Exchange Act. See id. § 6d.
A broker that only accepts orders for futures contracts is referred to as an "introducing
broker." Id. § la(14). Customer funds used to secure futures contracts are held by a futures
commission merchant that carries the accounts of the introducing broker. Introducing brokers
must register with the CFTC. See id. § 6d.
2. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation insures accounts of customers held by
securities broker-dealers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3 (1994). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration insures customer accounts at commercial banks. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a (1994).
In 1974, Congress directed the CFTC to study whether federal account insurance was
needed for customer accounts held with futures commission merchants. The CFTC concluded
that such insurance was not needed because the failure rate for futures commission merchants
was very low. See Report to the Congress Concerning Commodity Futures Account Insurance,
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,235 (Nov. 1, 1976).
3. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1)(i)(A) (1996). Introducing brokers are also subject to net cap-
ital requirements, albeit lesser ones than those imposed on futures commission merchants. See
id. § 1.17(a)(1)(ii)(A). For ease of reference, this Article will focus on the net capital require-
ments imposed on futures commission merchants. The discussion, nevertheless, remains equally
applicable to introducing brokers.
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The CFTC's net capital rule is also flawed in several respects, and may
actually reduce customer protection in some circumstances. 4
The large losses experienced by firms dealing in over-the-counter
derivatives has further focused attention on the need for a more risk-
based net capital rule when a firm is exposed to large market risks by
leveraged instruments. 5 This Article will examine the CFTC's present
net capital rule, discuss its deficiencies, and propose an alternative
risk-based methodology.
MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
The foremost protection against defaults, and for maintaining the
financial integrity of the futures markets, is the margin system estab-
lished by the futures exchanges. Under this system, a futures commis-
sion merchant is liable to the exchange's clearinghouse in the event of
a customer default.6 To guard against the failure of the futures com-
mission merchant, the exchanges require a good faith deposit of
money at the time a futures transaction is initiated ("initial margin")
and recognition of daily losses through "variation" margin calls.7
The initial margin requirement assures a cushion of liquid funds
to assure performance and to cover the losses that the exchanges pre-
dict may occur from the position in a given period of time. This is a
risk-based analysis of the funds needed initially to secure the position.
Even more importantly, variation margin calls require prompt
loss recognition and the commitment of additional liquid funds to as-
sure that losses are recognized immediately. There is very little delay
in this loss recognition-additional funds can be demanded under ex-
change rules on as little as one hour's notice.
4. See discussion infra pp. 1103-04.
5. See generally, Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and the Reg-
ulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1994).
6. This liability runs first to futures commission merchants that are "clearing" members of
an exchange. Other futures commission merchants clear through a clearing member and are
liable to their clearing member for defaults by their customers. See generally, Peltz v. SHB
Commodities, Inc., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep (CCH) $ 24,810 (S.D.N.Y.
April 10, 1990).
7. Unlike margin requirements imposed in the securities industry, margin for futures con-
tracts is not a limitation on credit. Margin for futures contracts is designed simply to assure
payment of the obligations that may result from trading futures. See Jerry W. Markham, Federal
Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L.
REV. 59, 63 (1991).
Initial market requirements for futures contracts are often only a small percentage of the
notional value of the futures contracts. Nevertheless, customers must supply additional "varia-
tion" margin promptly when futures prices move adversely. See THOMAS A. HIERONYrVMUs, Eco-
NOMIcs OF FurruRrs TRA N o 64-65 (2d ed. 1977).
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Exchange margin requirements guard against the danger that a
futures commission merchant will allow customers to avoid recogni-
tion of their losses in the hope that the market will recover. This sys-
tem is remarkably effective. Although low margins required by the
futures industry have been criticized as encouraging speculation and
price volatility,8 the failure rate for futures commission merchants is
very low.9 Customer losses have only infrequently endangered the fu-
tures markets.'0 In fact, since the 1970s, no member of a major com-
modity futures exchange has experienced a failure that resulted in a
loss of customer funds. 1
The CFTC does not directly regulate exchange-set margin re-
quirements. 12 Rather, the CFTC has several back-up tiers of regula-
tory protection. One such tier is the CFTC's requirement that
customer funds be maintained in segregated accounts.' 3 This means
that customer funds must be segregated from the funds of the futures
customer merchant. These segregated accounts are then treated in a
manner similar to trust accounts.14 Customers are given priority with
respect to funds in the segregated accounts in the event of
bankruptcy. 15
The imposition of margin requirements and the segregation of
customer funds should, in theory, provide full protection to customers.
8. See generally, Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of
1987-The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993 (1988).
9. See Report to the Congress, supra note 2.
10. This is not to suggest that their have not been any threats to the system. The so-called
"Hunt Silver Crisis" in 1980 threatened the existence of one large brokerage firm and threatened
others with large losses. See REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION, THE SILVER CRISIS OF 1980 (1982). The Stock Market Crash of 1987 also caused grave
concerns when billions of dollars of margin calls had to be met on short notice. See S. REP. No.
300, at 27-28 (1990).
11. See Chicago Board of Trade, Discussion of Risk-Based Capital (Sept. 13, 1995) (on file
with author). Nevertheless, there have been losses by smaller futures commission merchants.
See infra p. 1102 and note 53.
12. The CFTC does not have the authority to change most exchange-set margins, except in
an emergency. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7a(12) (1994). After the Stock Market
Crash of 1987, the Federal Reserve Board was given supervisory authority over exchange mar-
gins for index futures. The Federal Reserve Board delegated that authority to the CFTC. The
CFTC has continued to defer to the exchanges in setting such margins. See generally, Fed Dele-
gates Authority to Set Margins on Stock Index Futures, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 545, 563
(Apr. 16, 1993).
13. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2). See also JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-
DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 4.08, at 4-117 to -151
(1995).
14. The comparison to a trust account is not perfect. Among other things, a futures com-
mission merchant may keep the interest earned on funds held in customer segregated accounts.
See Craig v. Refco, Inc., 816 F.2d 347, 348 (7th Cir. 1987).
15. See Franklin Feldman & Judah C. Sommer, The Special Commodity Provisions of the
New Bankruptcy Code, 37 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1517 (1982).
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A customer failing to meet a margin call will have its account liqui-
dated. Hopefully, the funds of the customer on hand, or subject to a
variation margin call, will meet any shortfall. If not, the futures com-
mission merchant is liable for the difference. Other customers should
not be endangered because their segregated funds may not be used by
the futures commission merchant to margin or secure the obligation of
a defaulting customer. 16
Unfortunately, there have been occasions when a futures com-
mission merchant did use the funds of other customers to meet the
margin requirements of a defaulting customer. Shortfalls were in-
curred, for example, in the bankruptcies of Incomco and Chicago Dis-
count Commodity Brokers.17 Nevertheless, the assets involved in the
bankruptcies of futures commission merchants totaled less than $10
million between 1938 and 1985.18
To assure even further protection, the CFTC has imposed an-
other level of regulatory protection in the form of its net capital rule.19
The net capital requirement seeks to assure that futures commission
merchants will have excess net capital committed to the business that
will be available in the event of a customer default. That capital must
be liquid and can be used to meet shortfalls where a customer has
defaulted.
The exchanges have a broader view of net capital. The Chicago
Board of Trade has noted that capital is the basis for business expan-
sion and firm equity.20 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has as-
serted that net capital requirements assure that futures commission
merchants have on hand funds sufficient to meet their day-to-day fi-
nancing needs. Particularly, futures commission merchants must have
funds on hand to meet clearinghouse obligations. This liquidity is
needed because there is a timing difference between the time that
those obligations must be met and the time when funds are actually
16. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d.
17. See MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 13, § 2.07, at 2-89.
18. See U.S. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BULLS AND BEARS:
U.S. SECURrrIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 122 n.61 (1990).
19. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1996). Segregation requirements are the "primary safeguard" for
commodity futures customers. Futures Commission Merchants: Minimum Financial Require-
ments; Proposed Rulemaking, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,423
(C.F.T.C. May 26, 1977). Net capital requirements are simply an additional layer of protection
from the risk that a single customer may default and adversely affect other customer accounts.
The CFTC thus views its net capital rule to be a "backup" to the requirements for a segregation
of customer funds and margin requirements. See Remarks of Paul H. Bjamason, Jr., Chief Ac-
countant, Division of Trading and Markets, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Net Capi-
tal Round Table, at 1 (Sept. 18, 1995) (on file with author).
20. See Chicago Board of Trade, supra note 11, at 4.
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collected from customers. That is, the futures commission merchant
may be required to post funds at the clearinghouse before they can be
collected from customers.21 Net capital also helps assure that a fu-
tures commission merchant has sufficient funds to meet its proprietary
trading obligations.22
The net capital rule further helps to assure that a futures commis-
sion merchant has made a sufficient financial commitment to doing
business and that it has an adequate inclination to operate its business
in a responsible manner. The net capital requirement promotes a
firm's financial integrity.23 Liquid net capital also facilitates transfers
of customer positions in the event of the liquidation of a futures com-
mission merchant. 24
BACKGROUND OF THE CFTC NET CAPITAL REQUIREMENT
Legislation enacted by Congress in 1968 authorized the CFTC's
predecessor, the Secretary of Agriculture, to impose financial respon-
sibility requirements on futures commission merchants. 25 The Secre-
tary had sought this legislative authority because there were
"instances of persons being registered with no capital whatsoever. '26
The Secretary noted that "underfinanced brokerage firms have been
found to be most likely to dip into customers' funds or resort to sharp
trading practices to bolster their money needs. '27 Under this legisla-
tion, futures commission merchants could meet their financial respon-
sibility requirements by complying with the net capital rules of
contract markets where they were members. A futures commission
merchant that was not a member of a contract market was required to
have minimum capital of ten thousand dollars or an amount based on
21. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Proposal for a Risk Based Approach to Capital 1
(Aug. 24, 1995) (on file with author).
22. See id.
23. See CFTC Final Rules Governing Foreign Futures and Options Transactions, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1152, 1155 (July 31, 1987).
24. The CFTC's Chairman stated at a "roundtable" conference on net capital that
"[m]inimum capital requirements are designed to protect customers and to ensure the financial
integrity of the markets. As such they support the capacity to transfer or liquidate positions in
market emergencies such as that experienced as a result of the Barings Collapse." Remarks of
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Net Capital Round-
table: The Pros and Cons of the Commission's Existing Rule 1 (Sept. 18, 1995) (on file with
author).
25. See Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26 (1968).
26. S. REP. No. 947, at 1 (1968).
27. Id.
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the size of the proprietary and customer positions held by the firm
plus five percent of the firm's aggregate indebtedness. 28
The creation of the CFTC in 1974 led to a renewed interest in net
capital requirements. 29 The CFTC soon commenced efforts to
strengthen the financial responsibility requirements imposed on fu-
tures commission merchants. 30 The CFTC believed that the broad ex-
pansion of the futures industry occurring during the 1970s required
additional capital commitments on the part of futures commission
merchants. 31
The CFTC adopted changes in its net capital rule that require
futures commission merchants to maintain adjusted net capital in the
greater of fifty thousand dollars or four percent of customer funds
required to be segregated under the Commodity Exchange Act.32 A
futures commission merchant could, alteratively, meet the net capital
requirements of a contract market or those imposed by the National
Futures Association ("NFA").33
Since all futures commission merchants are contract market
members or members of the NFA, the rules of those self-regulatory
28. See In re Sy B. Gaiber & Co., 31 Agric. Dec. 474, 486-88 (Apr. 12, 1972).
29. The CFTC was created through the enactment of the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, 1389-90 (1974). The CFTC assumed the
powers previously exercised by the Secretary of Agriculture and was given increased regulatory
authority. See id.
30. Prior to the adoption of the CFTC's net capital rule in 1978, the Chicago Board of Trade
and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange used a net capital rule based on working capital adjusted
by a safety factor charge. Firms that were members of those exchanges were assessed capital
charges equal to one half of one percent of the greater of the long and short market value of
customer positions and ten percent of the firm's proprietary positions. See Chicago Board of
Trade, supra note 11, at 2.
31. See Futures Commission Merchants; Minimum Financial Requirements: Proposed Rule
Making, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,423, at 21,681 (C.F.T.C.
May 26, 1977).
32. See Adoption of Amended Minimum Financial Requirements, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,661, at 22,677 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 8, 1978). The four per-
cent requirement does not include the value of commodity options purchased by customers on a
contract market. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1)(i)(A)-(B) (1996).
A futures commission merchant that is dually registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") may use the net capital requirements of the agency imposing the higher
requirement. See id. § 1.17(a)(1)(i)(B).
33. The NFA is the futures industry analogue of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. The NFA and the exchanges are required to adopt minimum financial responsibil-
ity requirements. See id. § 1.52. The approach taken by the CFTC stands in sharp contrast to
the net capital approach taken by the SEC in imposing net capital requirements on broker-
dealers. The SEC had found that the securities exchanges had failed to enforce their net capital
rules during the "paper work" crisis of the late 1960s. The SEC adopted a "uniform" net capital
rule that most broker-dealers were subject to and which facilitated uniform interpretation. See
MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 13, § 2.07[2], at 2-77. Cf. Proposed Adoption and Monitoring
of Minimum Financial Requirements by Self-Regulatory Organizations, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 20,456, at 21,875-78 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 1, 1977).
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bodies control the net capital requirements of futures commission
merchants. The NFA and the major exchanges require a futures com-
mission merchant to maintain net capital of two hundred fifty thou-
sand dollars or four percent of segregated funds of customers
(exclusive of customer long options positions). 34
These net capital rules are, to some degree, risk-based meas-
ures.35 As the CFTC staff has noted, the amount of segregated funds
to which the four percent requirement applies is generally related to
margin requirements, which are in turn based upon exchanges risk-
based evaluation systems for margin.36 Nevertheless, funds held in
segregation are not always related to exchange margin requirements,
and the four percent requirement is not based on any risk-based
formula; it is simply an arbitrary figure.
37
NET CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER INDUSTRIES
The concept of net capital and the concern with risk-based formu-
las are not peculiar to the futures industry. Securities firms, insurance
companies, and banking institutions are all subject to net capital stan-
dards to ensure their financial integrity. Each of those industries is
using, or experimenting with, risk-based net capital requirements.
The net capital concept in the banking industry appears to be a
spin-off of the requirement that banks keep cash or other liquid asset
reserves to meet customer demands.38 In recent years, the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision has acted to adopt uniform inter-
34. See CFTC Net Capital Round Table, A History of Capital Proposals Concerning Posi-
tion Risk 1 (Sept. 18, 1995) (unpublished work, on file with author). The net capital rules of the
NFA and the exchanges are subject to approval by the CFTC, as are amendments to those rules.
See 7 U.S.C. § 7a(12)(A) (1994). The CFTC has also proposed to increase its net capital rule to
reflect the requirements of the NFA rule, including a requirement of a minimum of two hundred
fifty thousand dollars for futures commission merchants. See Minimum Financial Requirements,
Prepayment of Subordinated Debt and Gross Collection of Exchange-Set Margin for Omnibus
Accounts, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,995 (1995) (proposed Dec. 13, 1995).
35. The CFTC staff has also pointed out that most futures commission merchants have ex-
cess net capital on hand, which means that regulatory requirements are not dictating the amount
of capital required in their business. See Bjarnason, supra note 19, at 1.
36. See id. at 2.
37. It is unclear where the four percent requirement came from. It appears to be loosely
related to the SEC's prior net capital computation for four percent of aggregate debit items for
securities broker-dealers. See generally Futures Commission Merchants: Minimum Financial Re-
quirements, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,423, at 21,687-88
(C.F.T.C. May 26, 1978); Proposed Adoption and Monitoring of Minimum Financial Require-
ments, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,577, at 22,351-53 (C.F.T.C.
Apr. 10, 1978).
38. See SHERMAN J. MAISEL, RISK AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY IN COMMERCIAL BANKS 19
(1981).
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national capital adequacy standards for banks.39 More recently, the
Basle Committee advanced standards to permit risk-based capital re-
quirements that consider both on- and off-balance sheet risks in mea-
suring capital adequacy.40
On July 14, 1995, the Federal Reserve Board also proposed
amendments to its risk-based capital requirements to incorporate
market risks from foreign exchange, commodity trading activities, and
the trading of debt and equity securities. The proposal allows banks
and bank holding companies with large proprietary trading operations
to calculate their capital charges for market risk using their own inter-
nal value-at-risk models or to use risk management techniques devel-
oped by bank supervisors. This proposal was based on the proposal
by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. If adopted, these
changes will be implemented in 1997.41
The insurance industry also uses a risk-based capital approach to
better assure that insurance companies are able to meet their cus-
tomer obligations. The insurance industry's risk-based method seeks
to measure asset quality, default risk, adverse risk experience, interest
rate risk, and general business risks from assets held by insurance
companies. This methodology requires more capital for companies
holding assets that present higher investment risks.4 2
The securities industry has long been exposed to net capital re-
quirements. 43 Since 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") has also sought to impose uniform net capital requirements
39. See HAL S. Scor & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 214-17 (1995).
40. See id. at 219. A 1988 Basle Accord sought to protect banks against credit risk. The
present proposals are concerned with market risk. See A Brush with Basle, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16,
1995, at 89-90. The Basle Committee wants the banks to multiply their own value-at-risk deter-
minations times three, plus some because the banks' risk models may contain unrealistic assump-
tions about market movement. See id. The banks, however, are concerned that this will require
excess capital and that there is now an incentive to understate the value at risk. See id.
41. See Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Press Release (1995) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 3, 208, 225) (proposed July 14, 1995). An alternative to the risk-based proposals now
being considered by the Federal Reserve Board is a pre-commitment approach under which
banks would set aside the amount of capital that they were prepared to lose. See id. See also
Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, A Pre-Commitment Approach to Capital Requirements for
Market Risk (June, 1995) (unpublished work, on file with author); Bettering Basle, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 9, 1995, at 76.
42. See J.R. Burke, A Discussion of Risk Based Capital, J. AM. SOC'Y CLU & CHFC, May,
1993, at 22-24.
43. See MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 13, § 5.13, at 5-165 to -170. In 1992, the SEC
substantially increased its net capital requirement by requiring a minimum net capital of two
hundred fifty thousand dollars. See Net Capital Rule, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
31511, 52 SEC Docket 4148, 4148 (Nov. 24, 1992).
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on broker-dealers.4 4 Securities industry net capital requirements
have, however, traditionally been directed at assuring that firms have
sufficient excess liquid assets on hand to meet customer obligations.45
Using an extremely complex calculation, the SEC rules seek to "hair-
cut" illiquid assets (i.e. reducing their value for net worth purposes)
and excluding from net worth other assets whose values are difficult to
measure or which may not be available to meet customers'
obligations.46
The SEC has recently begun to examine risk-based measures for
its net capital requirements.47 In 1993, the SEC issued a concepts re-
lease seeking public comment on the adoption of a net capital stan-
dard that would be risk-based for firms dealing in derivative contracts
such as option futures swaps and forward contracts. 48
Subsequently, the SEC proposed an amendment to its net capital
rule that would allow broker-dealers to use theoretically priced posi-
tion risks when calculating net capital charges for list options.49 The
proposal was based on a Theoretical Intermarket Margining System
("TIMS") developed by the Options Clearing Corporation, which
clears exchange-listed options in the United States.50
44. The uniform net capital rule allowed computation of net capital under alternate formu-
las. See MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 13, §§ 5.04-5.05, at 5-26 to -61. The "basic" method
limits the permissible amount of aggregate indebtedness of broker-dealers. See id. Aggregate
indebtedness is the total liabilities of a broker-dealer. See id. Certain liabilities were excluded
such as those that were adequately collateralized by assets owned by the broker-dealer. See id.
The "alternative" method required the maintenance of net capital in amount equal to a
specific amount (now two hundred fifty thousand dollars) or two percent (previously four per-
cent) of aggregate debit items. See Adoption of Amendments to Rule 15c3 1 and Adoption of an
Alternative Net Capital Requirement for Certain Brokers and Dealers, Securities Exchange Act
Exchange Release No. 34-11497, 7 SEC Docket 241, 242 (June 26, 1975).
45. See In re Guy D. Marianette, 11 S.E.C. 967, 970-71 (1942).
46. The SEC net capital rule does not seek to require the maintenance of excess capital only
in cash. Rather, the rule seeks liquid assets. See id.
47. The SEC had earlier asserted that its segregation rule could supplant net capital rules
for broker-dealers: "It is contemplated that, with operational experience, the rules regarding
customer funds and securities will eventually supplement and then eliminate the complex struc-
ture of the net capital requirements and, with that, the corresponding intricacies of interpreta-
tion." U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE FINANCING AND REGULATORY CAPITAL NEEDS OF THE
SEcuRrrIES INDUsTRY 7 n.17 (1985).
48. See Net Capital Rule, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 54 SEC Docket
28, 29 (May 10, 1993).
49. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; American Stock Exchange, Inc., 58 Fed. Reg.
26,992, 26,993-94 (1993).
50. See Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-33761, 56 SEC Docket 771, 772 (Mar. 15, 1994).
The TIMS system is a binomial pricing model that was developed by John Cox, Stephen Ross,
and Mark Rubinstein. See id.
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RISK BASED CAPITAL IN THE FUTURES INDUSTRY
The commodity futures industry has changed dramatically since
the adoption of the CFTC's net capital rule in 1978: trading volume
has increased enormously; the customer base is now dominated by
large financial institutions and the futures markets have become
globalized and intertwined with other financial markets, particularly
the securities markets.51 These changes have given rise to concern
that the CFTC's present capital rule does not reflect the effect of
those changes on the industry.
The use of risk-based capital methodologies in other industries
has also given impetus to consideration of such an approach in the
futures industry. The use of risk-based methodologies in other indus-
tries, however, does not translate automatically into a need for such
an approach in the futures industry. Net capital requirements in the
securities, banking, and insurance industries are designed to assure
that the firms operating in those industries are able to meet their cus-
tomer obligations. These obligations include, among other things, the
return of deposits by banks, the payment of insurance proceeds from
the general accounts of insurance companies, and the return of cus-
tomer funds and securities held by a broker-dealer in the securities
industry.
There is less of a conceptual need for net capital for such pur-
poses in the futures industry. Futures commission merchants do not
act as principals in transactions with their customers. Rather, a fu-
tures commission merchant acts solely as an agent in transmitting or-
ders and executing customers' orders on the exchanges. The counter-
party to all parties in exchange-traded futures contracts is the ex-
change clearinghouse. The clearinghouse is interceded between the
buyers and sellers of futures contracts and exchange-traded options.
In the event of a default, the clearinghouse is responsible for perform-
ance of the opposing party's obligations.
Futures commission merchants must, of course, handle customer
funds that are used to margin or secure trades on the futures ex-
changes. A futures commission merchant may also be holding excess
funds for their customers at any given time. This depository arrange-
ment is secured by the requirement that customer funds be held in
segregated accounts. Only if margin calls are not met or if segregation
is breached should there be a real need for net capital requirements.
51. See Chicago Board of Trade, supra note 11, at 3.
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The danger with which the CFTC net capital requirement should
be most directly concerned is the possibility of a shortfall of custom-
ers' funds held in segregation. A shortfall is most likely to occur
where the futures commission merchant uses the funds of one cus-
tomer to meet the margin obligations of another customer. Futures
commission merchants have an incentive to convert other customers'
funds for such a purpose because the futures commission merchant is
liable to the clearinghouse or to a clearing member for the failure of a
customer to pay margin calls. Thus, if a customer defaults and the
customer does not have funds on hand with the futures commission
merchant, the futures commission merchant must pay the shortfall
from its own funds. This presents a temptation to the futures commis-
sion merchant to "borrow" the funds of other customers, particularly
if the futures commission merchant's capital is inadequate to meet the
shortfall. Such conduct constitutes a conversion of customers' funds
and is a serious criminal offense.
Net capital adds little to customer protection if segregation rules
are strictly followed. Should a customer default, the futures commis-
sion merchant would be liable for the shortfall, and any capital that it
had would be lost. If the futures commission merchant is not a clear-
ing member, the clearing member that cleared the futures commission
merchant's positions would have to satisfy the loss. If the clearing
member is unable to do so, the clearinghouse and other clearing mem-
bers would have to absorb the loss. This would impose a systemic
risk, but it is rather doubtful whether net capital requirements for a
single firm would reduce systemic risk to any great degree, particu-
larly since the clearinghouse will be imposing its own capital require-
ments for clearing members.
The real problem has been that, where failure occurs, the futures
commission merchant had met the margin deficiency of one customer
with other customers' funds. 52 This constitutes conversion-that is,
stealing. It is questionable, however, whether net capital require-
ments have anything more than a marginal deterrent effect for such
conversions and whether net capital requirements prevent firms from
using other customers' monies. Excess capital does mean, at least,
that the failing futures commission merchant should have assets on
52. A more perfect segregated system could perhaps be created using advanced computer
technology. This would require sub-accounts to be maintained by futures commission
merchants, depositories of customer funds, and the clearinghouses. The improper transfer of
monies from one account to margin trades of another account could then be monitored. The
cost of such a system would, however, appear to outweigh its advantages.
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hand that will reduce some deficiencies in the segregated account.
Net capital also provides a screening mechanism that keeps out fly-by-
night firms. The net capital rule requires firms to commit capital to
the risks of the business; that is, to the risk of a customer default. This
gives the futures commission merchant an incentive to screen its cus-
tomers' creditworthiness carefully so as to avoid default and loss of
capital. In the event of a customer default, the futures commission
merchant will have assets to lose. This gives the futures commission
merchant a stake in assuring that customers perform on their margin
obligations.
CONCENTRATED POSITIONS
A related danger to customer segregated funds is that of concen-
trated positions in customer accounts. In the event of a large market
move, the concentrated (and leveraged) position may quickly gener-
ate enormous margin calls that the customer is unable to meet. Once
again, the futures commission merchant will be tempted to use other
customers' funds. The insolvency of a futures commission merchant
can also result in a loss of market confidence.
The danger of concentrated positions is not merely theoretical.
The CFTC's confidence in its net capital system was shaken in 1985 by
the default of a firm called Volume Investors Corporation ("Volume
Investors"), a clearing member of the Commodities Exchange in New
York. Volume Investors' default was occasioned by concentrated po-
sitions held by three customers in uncovered short gold options. 53
There was a concern that customer losses would be experienced be-
cause the firm's capital was inadequate to cover losses from this trad-
ing. In response to the Volume Investors default, the CFTC proposed
amendments to its net capital rule that would have increased net capi-
tal requirements for a firm holding concentrated customer positions.54
This proposed "concentration charge" 55 was the subject of a great deal
of comment and industry programs such as Chicago-Kent College of
53. See CFTC Net Capital Round Table, supra note 34, at 1-2. First LaSalle Services, an-
other futures commission merchant, failed at about the same time as the result of unrelated
losses in government securities transactions. See id. at 1.
54. See Chicago Board of Trade, supra note 11, at 2.
55. For a discussion of the CFTC's proposed concentration charge, see CFTC Net Capital
Round Table, supra note 34, at 4; Perry L. Taylor, Jr. et al., Net Capital Requirements: A Survey
of Current Issues: Volume Investors to the Present, A Paper Presented Before the FIA, Law &
Compliance Meeting 3-4, (Annapolis, Md., May 20-22, 1987) (on file with author).
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Law's Securities Industry Association and Practicing Law Institute
programs, as well as the target of much industry criticism.5 6
The CFTC did not adopt the concentration charge. Instead, it
asserted that it would await industry proposals on a more risk-based
net capital approach.5 7 Thereafter, the Chicago Board of Trade
formed a committee that recommended that CFTC net capital re-
quirements should be based on a percentage of risk associated with
individual customer accounts, rather than on funds held for custom-
ers.5 8 Later, in 1993, the CFTC's Regulatory Coordination Advisory
Committee proposed a risk-based capital approach.5 9
SOME FLAWS IN THE CFTC NET CAPITAL RULE
The CFTC's net capital rule has suffered criticism that goes be-
yond a lack of direct risk-based application. The exchanges have
noted, for example, that there is an incentive under existing net capital
standards for futures commission merchants to return excess funds
held for customers. The present net capital rule requires futures com-
mission merchants to have excess liquid capital in an amount equal to
four percent of customer funds in segregation. 60 Accordingly, if a cus-
tomer has funds in excess of those required by exchange margin re-
quirements, the futures commission merchant has a disincentive to
hold the funds because futures commission merchants will be required
to increase its own capital by four percent of the excess funds.
To avoid that requirement, the futures commission merchant may
return the excess funds to the customer even though the customer is
willing to leave the funds on-hand. This reduces the amount of funds
on-hand that could be used to guard against failure by those custom-
ers.61 Futures Commission Merchants often find themselves in the po-
sition of returning excess margin to customers in order to reduce what
they perceive to be unnecessary capital charges, when prudence might
56. See CFTC Net Capital Round Table, supra note 34, at 2-3.
57. The CFTC has recently stated that it is still considering the need for a concentration
charge. See Minimum Financial Requirements, Prepayment of Subordinated Debt and Gross
Collection of Exchange-Set Margin for Omnibus Accounts, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,995, 63,999 (Dec. 13,
1995).
58. The Chicago Board of Trade proposed to eliminate the four percent of segregated funds
requirement and substitute five percent of the "net potential risk" of customer accounts. This
net potential risk would be the greater of contract market maintenance margin requirements or
a standard volatility factor. See CFTC Net Capital Round Table, supra note 34, at 5. Another
alternative proposed by the Futures Industry Association following the CFTC's concentration
proposal would require an early warning of concentrated risks in customer accounts. See id. at 7.
59. See Chicago Board of Trade, supra note 11, at 3.
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(c)(5)(iii) (1996).
61. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 21, at 1.
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otherwise dictate that they should retain excess margin. '62 Thus, the
CFrC's net capital rule penalizes futures commission merchants for
holding customer funds in excess of minimum margin requirements-
the exact opposite of what a net capital rule should be designed to
accomplish.63
There are other criticisms of the present net capital rule.64 An
industry position paper has argued that a four percent requirement for
short options value is unrelated to the risk in customers' accounts. 65
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has further charged that the
CFTC's net capital rule does not fully account for the underlying risk
of customer accounts carried by a futures commission merchant; that
the rule ignores the trading activity of non-customer accounts and for-
eign domiciled accounts trading on foreign markets; that there is a
greater capital requirement on the "winning" side of a customer's po-
sition, rather than on the losing side; and that the rule does not take
into account customer accounts which meet margin requirements
through letters of credit. 66 Further, the rule may also be misleading as
to persons evaluating the creditworthiness of a futures commission
merchant because they may believe that excess capital is a reflection
of the firm's ability to withstand market risk. It is not.67
A PROPOSAL FOR A MORE RISK-BASED NET CAPITAL RULE
There have been several proposals that have sought to convince
the CFTC to take a more risk-based approach to net capital. The
62. Chicago Board of Trade, supra note 11, at 2.
63. The CFTC staff has suggested that this anomaly could be reduced by granting a credit
for excess margin funds. See Bjarnason, supra note 19, at 2.
64. The complexity of the net capital rule also gives rise to questions regarding whether the
present structure is really necessary.
65. See CFTC Net Capital Round Table, Position Paper-4% Short Option Value Charge
(Sept. 18, 1995) (on file with author). The CFTC staff has indicated that the short options value
charge may no longer be needed as a result of exchange margin evaluations. See Bjamason,
supra note 19, at 2.
The CFTC staff has adopted a no-action position that permits futures commission
merchants to reduce their net capital charges for short commodity options positions. See CFTC
Net Capital Round Table, Net Capital Issues List, (Sept. 18, 1995) (on file with author). The no-
action letter, which was intended for certain market maker firms and professional traders, gave
short options net capital charge relief in order to alleviate the disparity engendered under the
existing rule. See Memorandum from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, CFTC Division of Trading
and Markets to the CFTC (July 20, 1995), 1995 CFTC Ltr. LEXIS 67 (July 28, 1995) (discussing
short option value relief for market maker firms and CFTC interpretative letter 95-65). The
CFTC is "considering a rethinking" of the relief granted in this no-action letter. See Minimum
Financial Requirements, Prepayment of Subordinated Debt and Gross Collection of Exchange-
Set Margin for Omnibus Accounts, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,995, 63,999 (Dec. 13, 1995).
66. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 21, at 3-4.
67. See id.
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commodity exchanges advocated such an approach in the wake of the
Volume Investors failure.68 The world's two largest futures markets,
the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
are also continuing to seek a risk-based capital approach. The Chi-
cago Board of Trade, in particular, has advocated a more "compre-
hensive risk-based approach for measuring capital adequacy." 69
A Regulatory Coordination Advisory Committee of the CFTC
has also recommended that a risk-based capital approach be adopted
by the CFTC. This proposal was similar to the proposal made by the
commodity exchanges in 1987. The Advisory Committee asserted that
United States firms were being placed at a competitive disadvantage
in international markets by existing net capital requirements. The
Committee was also of the view that the present rule is producing
results that offer less, rather than more, protection. 70
The CFTC has resisted all of these efforts. 71 It would appear,
however, that the CFTC's goal of customer protection would be more
readily satisfied through a more risk-based net capital system. Such a
system would require increased capital as market exposure increases
and reduced capital at lower levels of exposure.
A risk-based net capital system would seem to be an easy adapta-
tion to the existing regulatory structure. The exchanges are already
setting margin requirements using a risk-based measurement system
called Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk Performance Bond System
("SPAN"). 72 That system has withstood the test of time under actual,
sometimes volatile, market conditions. A risk-based capital require-
ment that is tied to the margin requirements would appear to be ad-
ministratively convenient. The SPAN system could be applied on a
contract-by-contract basis to establish risk parameters. A new risk-
68. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
69. Chicago Board of Trade, supra note 11, at 5. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has
proposed a net capital requirement that would be based at least in part upon a percentage of a
futures commission merchant's customer and non-customer margin requirements. See Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, supra note 21, at 5.
70. See generally Morton Lane, Capital Does Matter, FUTURES INDUSTRY, Nov.-Dec. 1993,
at 43.
71. For a discussion of the regulatory concerns raised by risk-based capital standards, see
generally, IOSCO WORKING PARTY, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITIES REGULATORS OF THE
INCREASED USE OF VALUE AT RISK MODELS BY SECURITIES FIRMS 3 (IOSCO Working Paper,
June 1995).
72. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, A New Margining System, Standard Portfolio Analy-
sis of Risk (1989). The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has advocated the use of SPAN, which is a
risk-based system used to set domestic and foreign futures exchanges margin requirements, as
the basis for computing risk performance for net capital purposes. See Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change, supra note 21, at 5.
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based rule could then set required capital at a risk-based percent of
exchange requirements. The computations required under such a
formula would not be overly difficult, particularly since margin and
segregation requirements are calculated each day for all futures
accounts.
This approach is not revolutionary. A working group on interna-
tional competitiveness at the CFTC has already recommended that
the CFTC exchange set initial margin requirements that would be the
base under which futures commission merchants would meet the net
capital requirement. Initial margin requirements set by the exchanges
would be multiplied by four percent under this proposal.73 However,
the working group's proposal is still tied to an arbitrary four percent
figure. Nevertheless, this approach would still more directly reflect
the actual risk exposure of the futures commission merchant than the
existing rule. This proposal also does not discourage future commis-
sion merchants from having customers maintain excess funds on
hand.74
The working group's proposal is a step forward, but it may not
accurately state the actual risk of the futures commission merchant
from customer positions. An alternate approach would be to require
future commission merchants to set aside a percentage of exchange
minimum margin requirements as a reserve for meeting customer def-
icits. The percentage would vary depending on the volatility of spe-
cific positions. This reserve requirement would be reduced on an
individual account basis by excess customers' funds on hand and in-
creased by a charge for concentrated positions.75 The concentration
charge could also be reduced by excess funds held for a customer with
a concentrated position. There would, however, need to be some set
minimum amount of net capital that could not be met with excess cus-
tomer funds. This amount would assure funds on hand for meeting
immediate obligations and facilitate transfer of customer positions in
the event of default.
73. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Recommendations on Capital Require-
ments of Working Group on International Competitiveness (Feb. 24, 1993) (on file with author).
74. For another proposal suggesting the use of exchange-based margins as a net capital
requirement, see Roger D. Rutz, A Proposal to Implement Risk-Based Minimum Capital Re-
quirements for Futures Brokers in Singapore and FCMs in the United States 4-12 (1995) (on file
with author).
75. The reduction would be done on an account-by-account basis. If one account had a
large excess, that amount could not be used to reduce the net capital amount required for other
accounts not having an excess.
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The effect of this proposed system would be to encourage futures
commission merchants to charge what would amount to "broker-mini-
mum" margin requirements that would be in excess of exchange mini-
mums. Those funds would be segregated and could be invested in
liquid government securities.
This approach would encourage the futures commission merchant
to require minimums in excess of those set by the exchange. This
would have the effect of assuring that either the customers have ex-
cess funds on hand or that the futures commission merchant has capi-
tal dedicated to guard against defaults by customers who are posting
exchange minimums. Further, capital requirements would be reduced
as customers reduce exposure through increased margin or reduced
market exposure. The concentration charge would also assure greater
capital dedication where a customer's position presents higher levels
of risk.
This proposal would have the opposite effect of the present net
capital standard. The proposal would encourage customer funds to be
kept on hand. Indeed, futures commission merchants could reduce
the amount of their dedicated capital by requiring customers to post
additional margin funds.
Competition may dictate that futures commission merchants use
only exchange-required minimum margins, which would provide
heavily capitalized firms with a competitive advantage. That, how-
ever, is a cost of any net capital requirement. Small firms will always
be at a disadvantage in competing with more heavily capitalized firms.
Further, a firm supporting positions with its own capital must pay a
price in diverting capital for that purpose. This would appear to be a
cost of doing business that must be met either by requiring excess
funds from customers or by adding the firm's own net capital, if net
capital purposes are to be fulfilled.
VALUE AT RISK PROPOSALS MAY BE Too RISKY
One method for risk measurement is that of "value at risk"
("VAR"). This risk measurement device seeks to estimate the maxi-
mum potential loss from assets or derivative positions held by a firm
over a given period of time.76 VAR is currently a popular device for
76. For a discussion of VAR and some alternative approaches to estimating VAR and its
use in managing financial risk, see James V. Jordan & Robert J. Mackay, Center for Study of
Futures and Options Markets, Assessing Value at Risk for Equity Portfolios: Implementing Al-
ternative Techniques (discussion draft, July 1995) (on file with author).
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measuring net capital requirements. The 1988 Basle Capital Accord
allows the use of the VAR as the methodology for computing the
amount of capital under its risk-based guidelines. A derivatives policy
group has also proposed an oversight system for over-the-counter de-
rivative dealers that would use a voluntary system of identifying capi-
tal at risk.77 There are dangers to using VAR: risk assessment is not
calculated uniformly among firms and the results can vary dramati-
cally based on the data and assumptions used to reach the valued risk
figure. A firm using differing assumptions may produce widely differ-
ent risk assumptions in capital requirements. 78
A better alternative would appear to be the existing SPAN risk
measurement system used by the futures exchanges to compute risk
levels in setting margin requirements. This system has proved effec-
tive in assessing futures trading risks. It also provides a uniform mea-
surement system that will be readily accessible by all futures
commission merchants.
REFORM EFFORTS WILL NEED THE ASSISTANCE OF
RISK-BASED TESTING
The viability of any change in the existing net capital rule will
depend in large measure on its acceptance by both regulators and the
industry. That acceptance will meet resistance.79 First, the industry
will oppose any requirement that increases capital over existing levels.
Certainly, there is good reason for such a view since the number of
failures in the futures industry have been almost negligible. Second,
regulators will oppose any system that reduces net capital. Their view
is that the market is becoming more risk-based and that more capital,
not less, is needed to reflect that fact.80 Regulators also will need
some convincing that a risk-based system will work in stressful market
conditions.
77. See Derivatives Policy Group, The Framework for Voluntary Oversight (March 1995)
(on file with author).
78. See Tanya Styblo Beder, VAR: Seductive But Dangerous, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct.
1995, at 12-13.
79. In September of 1995, the CFTC's Chairman, Mary Schapiro, held a roundtable to dis-
cuss changes in the CFTC's net capital rule and the possible use of risk-based capital require-
ments. See Schapiro, supra note 24. There was no consensus for dropping the existing system
and substituting a risk-based assessment measure. Many participants inclined toward adjusting
the CFTC's existing rule to reduce obvious adverse effects. The CFTC subsequently expressed
only mild interest in adopting a more risk-based approach. See Minimum Financial Require-
ments, Prepayment of Subordinated Debt and Gross Collection of Exchange-Set Margin for
Omnibus Accounts, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,995, 63,996 (Dec. 13, 1995).
80. The CFTC staff has advocated "fine-tuning" rather than substantial changes in net capi-
tal rule. See Bjamason, supra note 19, at 2.
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Consequently, the "political" obstacles to the creation of a risk-
based system are formidable. Only if net capital levels remain the
same will there be agreement by the industry and the regulators to
change. In that unlikely circumstance, the question must arise
whether it is really necessary to go to a new system if the existing
system is working.
Movement by either regulators or the industry is unlikely without
sufficient testing and data to determine what the actual effects will be
on existing net capital requirements. The prudent course for the in-
dustry and regulators would be to test market exposures of futures
commission merchants under an appropriate risk-based measure.
From such a study, a better judgment could be made as to whether the
existing system is adequate, or whether a risk-based system would be
more appropriate. At the very least, evidence one way or the other
would provide guidance on whether existing levels are adequate or
whether even lower levels would be "safe."
Should such a study determine that existing capital levels are in-
adequate for a risk-based system, the question may arise whether
there is a need for increased capital or whether some alternative
should be established for protecting against failures. In the event that
the study determines that less capital is needed, then certainly the reg-
ulators should accept that judgment and move toward risk-based net
capital requirements so as to make the industry as efficient as possible,
while providing customer protection.
Help in this area may be on the way. In February of 1995, the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, the New
York Mercantile Exchange, and NFA began a risk-based capital study.
Hopefully, that study will provide some data on the effect of a risk-
based capital system on the amount of capital that will be needed
should such a system be adopted. 81
CONCLUSION
The CFTC's existing net capital rule has significant flaws that are
in need of correction. The structure of the rule also needs to be re-
examined to determine if a more risk-based approach would be ap-
propriate. The likely candidate for adoption as a risk-based system is
81. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 21, at 6-7. The Chicago Board of Trade
has also advocated coordination with the SEC on net capital requirements since many futures
commission merchants are dually registered with the SEC and CFTC. See Chicago Board of
Trade, supra note 11, at 1.
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the SPAN system used by the exchanges for setting margin levels.
Further study is needed, however, to assess the adequacy of existing
capital and to determine how a more risk-based capital system will
respond in actual market conditions. Of course, it should be
remembered, as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange has noted, "No
capital requirement is foolproof."82 A default may occur even with
risk-based capital requirements.
82. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 21, at 6.
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